Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

Faculty Scholarship

7-20-2015

Amicus brief in support of motion for reconsideration, in the case
of Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publishing Co., Case no. 2015-0127,
Supreme Court of Ohio
David Forte
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, d.forte@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs
Part of the First Amendment Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Repository Citation
Forte, David, "Amicus brief in support of motion for reconsideration, in the case of Murray v. Chagrin
Valley Publishing Co., Case no. 2015-0127, Supreme Court of Ohio" (2015). Law Faculty Briefs and Court
Documents. 16.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs/16

This Briefs and Court Filings is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at
EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents by an
authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

IN

ROBERT

MURRAY,

E.

et

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Case No. 2015-0127

al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

CHAGRIN VALLEY PUBLISHING COMPANY,

:i:—

Appeal from the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals,
Eighth Appellate District, Case
et

~

No. 101394

al.

Defendants-Appellees

:f

1i

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION

4—

OF AMICUS CURIAE DAVID

David F. Forte (0034381)
Cleveland State University
C|eve|and—Marshal| College of Law

1801

Euclid

Cleveland,

Avenue

OH 44115

Telephone: 216.687.2342
E—mail: d.forte@csuohio.edu

Amicus

Curiae, Pro Se

4-

F.

42,1

FORTE, ESQ.

Michael Murray (0019626)
(Counsel of Record)
Lorraine R. Baumgardner (0019642)
Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Devan
55 Public Square

J.

2200 The Illuminating Building
Cleveland, OH 44113

Telephone: 216.781.5245
Facsimile: 216.781.8207

jmmurray@bgmd|aw.com
lbaumgardner@bgmdlaw.com
E-mail:

Counsel forAppellees
Chagrin Valley Publishing Company; H.
Kenneth Douthit, Ill; Todd Nighswonger; David
C, Lange; Douthit Communications, Inc.; 5a/i
Mcsherry; and Ron Hill.

Calabrese (0072709)
Tracy 5. Francis (0080879)
Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP
J.

Philip

950 Main Avenue, Suite 500
Cleveland, Ohio 44113

Mark S. Stemm (0023146)
L. Bradfield Hughes (0070997)

& Arthur

LLP

Columbus, Ohio 43215
Telephone: 614.227.2092
Facsimile: 614.227.2100
E-mail:

Pipino (0061634)
(Counsel of Record)

Molly

R.

L.

Gwin (0088189)

Isaac, Wiles,

Telephone: 216.443.2542
Facsimile: 216.443.9011
E-mail: pcalabrese@porterwright.com
tfrancis@porterwright.com

Porter Wright Morris
41 South High Street

Samuel

mstemm@porterwright.com

bhughes@porterwright.com
Kevin Anderson (0092847)
Fabian & Clendenin, PC

215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801.323.2225
Facsimile: 801.596.2814
E-mail: kanderson@fabianlaw.com

Burkholder

Two Miranova

Place, Suite

Counsel for Appellee
Patriots for Change

Dan

Cvetanovich (0021980)
(Counsel of Record)
Sabrina Haurin (0079321)
Bailey Cavalieri LLC
L.

One Columbus
10 West Broad

Street, Suite 2100
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3422
Telephone: 614.221.3155
Facsimile: 614.221.0479
Dan.cvetanovich@baileycavaliericom

Sabrina.haurin@bai|eycava|ieri.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Ohio Coal Association
Jeffrey Orr

St. Clairsville,

(Counsel of Record)
2017 Sunset Boulevard

Telephone: 740.338.3100
Facsimile: 740.338.3411
E-mail:

mmckown@coa|source.com

gbroadbent@coalsource.com

Counsel for Appellants
Robert E. Murray, Murray Energy Corporation,
American Energy Corporation, and The Ohio
Valley Coal Company

700

Columbus, Ohio 43215
Telephone: 614.221.2121
Facsimile: 614.365.9516
E-mail: spipino@isaacwi|es.com
mgwin@isaacwiles.com

Michael O. McKown (0013378)
Gary M. Broadbent (0083876)

46226 National Road
Ohio 43950

& Teetor, LLC

Brown (0016762)

Steubenville, Ohio

43952

Telephone: 740.282.1911
Facsimile: 740.282-5639
Brown.jeffrey@comcast.net
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Bryan Felmet, Esq.

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae David

F.

Forte, a graduate of Harvard College, with a

University of Toronto and JD. from the Columbia School of Law,

Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.

I

a law professor at the

have taught law for nearly forty years since

the law school as an Associate Professor
Affairs at

is

Ph.D from the

in

1976.

I

I

ﬁrst joined

served as Associate Dean for Academic

the law school from 1986-1988, and was the inaugural Charles

R.

Emrick, Jr./Calfee,

Halter

&

Griswold Endowed Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall from 2004-2007.

lawyer

in

good standing

My

in

Islamic Law, Jurisprudence, Natural Law, International Law, International
I

am

a

the State of Ohio.

primary teaching competencies include Constitutional Law, the

Constitutional History.

I

First

Amendment,

Human

Rights,

and

write and speak nationally on topics such as constitutional law,

religious liberty, Islamic law, the rights of families,

and international

review editor for the American Journal of Jurisprudence and

am

affairs.

I

served as book

Senior Editor of The Heritage

Guide to the Constitution (2006), 2d edition (2014), published by Regnery

&

Co, a clause-by-

clause analysis ofthe Constitution ofthe United States.

During the Reagan administration,

I

served as chief counsel to the United States

delegation to the United Nations and alternate delegate to the Security Council.
acting judge

have sat as

on the municipal court of Lakewood, Ohio and chaired the Professional

Committee of the Cleveland Bar

Association.

United States Supreme Court, and was
I

I

Obama’s recess appointments

have authored a number of

among several academics to join

recent Noel Canning case at the United States
President

I

Supreme

Ethics

briefs before the

an amicus brief

in

the

Court, regarding the legitimacy of

to the National Labor Relations Board.

have chosen to participate as an amicus curiae

I

Reconsideration

filed

by Appellants Robert

E.

I

support of the Motion for

Murray, Murray Energy Corporation, American

Energy Corporation, and The Ohio Valley Coal
scholar,

in

Company because

as a career constitutional

believe that Appellants’ case presents questions of keen interest to the bench and bar

that merit this Court's attention. The interest that Appellants’ appeal garnered from multiple

amici curiae and from the press
First

Amendment

issues

no accident

is

worthy of

-—

the case indeed presents a notable package of

this Court's review.

becoming ever fewer and farther between,
concerning the tension between:
jury,

and

(3)

(1)

this

In

we

all

share

where

civil

jury

trials

are

appeal presents important questions

the freedom of the press;

the compelling interests

Ohio,

in

(2)

the respect for the role of the

having access to meaningful judicial

remedies for reputational harms, where demonstrably false assertions of fact have been
published due to reporting or editorial

commentary that

a reasonable jury

might find reckless

and notjust negligent.
Here, although

I

express no opinion on the merits of Appellants’ claims for false—light

invasion of privacy or defamation,

parties.

me

Such short

share Appellants’ concern about the manner

were wrested from

non-frivolous claims
decision troubles

I

in light

a jury just before

trial.

The

trial

in

which their

court's ”postcard"

of the substantial summary-judgment record submitted by the

shrift paid

by the

trial

court

fails

to educate the parties or their counsel

about the basis for removing the case from the jury. Nor does

it

facilitate

meaningful appellate

review of the underlying facts of the case, particularly given the voluminous record developed
after substantial discovery.

If

a trial

judge concludes that summaryjudgment

is

appropriate

significant contested case such as this that implicates substantial constitutional questions,

in

a

then

he or she should explain the basis for that conclusion. As
the manner

which the

in

trial

a lack of

disputed facts seems

all

jgy

the

US. Supreme Court's Liberty

in

oppose discretionary review — which announced a new

this

how they are

context without elaborating on

time to draft meaningful decisions

decisions, then allowing a

explain below, an explanation of

particularly useful in light of the

cited by Appellees to

standard for trial courts to follow
If

will

court examined the parties’ submissions against the requisite

burden of proof would have been
Lobby decision —

I

(instead of the

is

to do so.

the culprit for "postcard” summary-judgment

overburdened judge) to sort through and decide

more appropriate

for both practical

and constitutional reasons —

not to mention those compelled by Civil Rule 56.

The Eighth

District's

Opinion affirming the

trial

court's decision

is

also concerning.

panel largely ignored certain evidence presented by Appellants that would
disputes of material fact on their defamation claim.

seem

The

to present

Such evidence included, but was not

limited to, an expert report by Professor Joel Kaplan, a respected journalist, academic, and

ombudsman who opined

that Appellees deviated from accepted standards of journalism.

Eighth District also failed to address materials suggesting that

harbored

deemed

ill

will

his

how to

one or more of the Appellees

companies — an issue

relevant (though not determinative) to actual malice.

students about
trial

toward Mr. Murray and

It is

this

will

Court has previously

difficult to instruct

proffer evidence to survive a dispositive motion

courts and courts of appeal

The

in

my

law

a defamation case

if

so quickly bypass an expert report such as the one

submitted here by Professor Kaplan, without bothering to address
permitting a properly instructed jury to weigh the evidence.

its

substance, and without

For the reasons described

more

fully

below, although

fundamental respect for the freedom of the press —

from

this

a respect

of the jury and threaten to leave without a chance at

who proffer substantial,
Ohio can

compelled by binding precedent

still

in

one below marginalize the

fair

adjudication those injured plaintiffs

protect the freedom of the press while allowing juries to resolve disputed

may

marginalize the

effectuating the rule of law from the time our nation

claim against the King: "For depriving us

in

many

critical role

first

trial

common

byjury

shall

law,

where the value

be preserved...”

in

that juries

began. (See,

cases, of the beneﬁts of Trial

Declaration of Independence para. 20 (U.S. 1776), and the protection ofjuries
Suits at

critical role

credible evidence supporting non-frivolous claims of defamation.

but decisions such as the one appealed here

have had

share the Eighth District panel's

Court and the U.S. Supreme Court as well as our people's long-standing traditions —I

also share Appellants’ concern that decisions such as the

facts,

I

by

e.g.,

the

Jury,”

The

in civil trials: ’’In

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of

U.S. Const.

amend VII.)

Personal and corporate reputations are worth protecting, and the

First

Amendment

guarantees not only the freedom of speech and press, but also access to the courts. This Court
should address Appellants’ case to ensure that access
trials in

is

not irretrievably

lost,

and before jury

defamation cases become an irrelevancy.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION
THIS APPEAL PRESENTS ISSUES OF GREAT GENERAL INTEREST CONCERNING THE QUANTITY
AND CALIBER OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROCEED BEYOND SUMMARV JUDGMENT IN A
DEFAMATION CASE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH FACTUAL ASSERTIONS BY EDITORS ON
EDITORIAL PAGES ARE PROTECTED (OR NOT) BY OHIO’S PRIVILEGE FOR OPINIONS
I.

Although the United States Supreme Court requires courts to assess summary
judgment in defamation cases in light of the plaintiffs’ ultimate burden of proof, Ohio
juries should not be precluded from resolving genuine disputes of fact concerning

and actual malice, particularly where credible experts have opined that the
defendants deviated from accepted practices of journalism and other evidence
falsity

suggests the possibility of reckless conduct.

Appellees say there

defamation

is

plaintiff faces at

"definitive[|y]” resolved

no reason
the

for this Court to ”revisit the evidentiary

summary judgment

by the U.S. Supreme Court

in

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). (Opp. at

The majority

in

Liberty

Lobby held

burden

stage” because that question

Anderson

Liberty Lobby,

v.

Inc.,

a

was

477 US.

6.)

that, in ruling

on

a

motion for summaryjudgment

in a

defamation case to which the actua|—malice rule applies, the judge must view the evidence
presented through the ”prism” of the

plaintiff's

substantive evidentiary burden, meaning that

the clear-and-convincing standard of proof "should be taken into account” by the

trial

judge as

he or she examines the materials that the parties have submitted pursuant to

Civil

Rule 56.

Liberty Lobby,

477

U.S. at 254-55.

That conclusion

Justice Rehnquist, perplexed. As Justice

opinion

how these

supposed to do

Id.

Brennan put

it,

Justice Brennan, joined by
“I

am

in

ruling

how one~sided

on a motion

in original).

evidence

is,

for

what

summary judgment.”

He explained

further:

'’In

former Chief

unable to divine from the Court's

evidentiary standards are to be considered, or

dissenting; emphasis

assess

left

Id,

a trial

at

other words,

judge

is

actually

258 (Brennan,

how does

a

J.,

judge

or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could ‘reasonably’ decide?”

at 265.

That
reconsider

in

is

the rub presented by this case and the very issue that the Court should

order to give appropriate guidance to courts below. On the issue of actual malice,

Appellants (who as non-moving parties,

all

inferences were due) submitted

quantity of competent, admissible evidence relevant to whether Mr. Lange

more than

may have

a trifling

published

certain false, factual assertions about Mr.

Murray and

his

companies with the

requisite degree

of fault. Even a cursory review of the Eighth District's opinion and of Appellants’

memorandum

opposing summaryjudgment shows that Appellants presented substantial evidence from which
a

reasonable jury could have found

in

their favor.

For example, the Eighth District failed to

consider the opinions of Appellants’ expert, Professor Kaplan,
Kaplan, an impressively credentialed professional
exhibits,

in

who reviewed

any meaningful way. Professor
all

pleadings, depositions, and

opined that Mr. Lange and the Chagrin Valley Times reporter departed from accepted

standards ofjournalism

in

multiple respects. For example, Professor Kaplan noted that had Mr.

Lange "done proper research or contacted Murray Energy Corp. or

Commentary, he

easily

would have avoided” inaccuracies

in

MSHA

before writing his

the Commentary.

These

observations are relevant to the actua|—malice question, according to the Supreme Court.

Harte-Hanks Camm.,
against

Inc.

E.g.,

Connaughtan, 491 Us. 657, 692 (1989) (upholding jury verdict

v.

newspaper that based

its

reports on allegations of a single source, without attempting

to verify her claims by interviewing another key witness or reviewing other sources of

information readily available).

Unfortunately

we do

not

know how the trial

court considered Professor Kap|an’s report

under Liberty Lobby, or any of the other evidence Appellants proffered

judgment record. The cursory decision
in

entirely obscures the

in

the large summary-

method. There

is

similar obscurity

the Opinion of the court of appeals. The portion of the Opinion devoted to Mr. Lange’s

(Opinion,

Lobby.

It

19-31) leaves that a mystery, just as Justice Brennan worried about

111]

is

a

mystery worth investigating by

this Court, at least so that future

in

Liberty

defamation

plaintiffs

(who already must shoulder substantial burdens) have some clue

caliber of evidence that will get
It

case.

them to

a jury in this State.

has been nearly thirty years since this Court applied Liberty Lobby

The Court did so

See Grau

v.

in a trio

K/einschmidt, 31 Ohio St.3d 84, 509 N.E.2d 399 (1987); Varanese

215, 520 N.E.2d 198 (1988).

In

in a

defamation

of opinions issued very soon after Liberty Lobby was decided.

St.3d 78, 518 N.E.2d 1177 (1988); and Perez

decision

as to the quantity or

v.

Scripps—Howard Broadcasting

each of these three cases,

this

v.

Co.,

Gall,

35 Ohio

35 Ohio St.3d

Court reversed a lower court's

favor of the defamation plaintiff, holding that insufficient evidence of actual malice

in

was contained

in

the record for a reasonable jury to find a reckless disregard for the truth.

Taken together, Liberty Lobby and

this Court's trio of

dated cases applying

it

in

the defamation

context raise a compelling question as yet unanswered by this Court — what amount or guality
of evidence
court here

will suffice?

in its

The substantial summary-judgment evidence unmentioned by the

trial

”postcard” decision, and bypassed by the Eighth District (including Mr. Kaplan’s

expert report, and the other materials cited

in

Appellants’

memorandum

opposing summary

judgment) provide the occasion for this Court to begin to answer that important question.

The

U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit, in Street

v. J.C.

Bradford

&

Co.,

886 F.2d

1472 (1989), addressed how Liberty Lobby and two other Supreme Court opinions issued the

same year ushered
1481

(Citing Liberty

in a

"new

era” of

summary-judgment

Lobby; Ce/otex Corp.

V.

Catrett,

(1986); and Matsushita E/ec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

106

S.Ct.

1348

practice” based

(1986)).

v.

477

practice.

U.S. 317,

Street,

886 F.2d

91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106

at

1476-

S.Ct.

2548

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 89 L.Ed.2d 538,

Street laid out ten ’’principles for ‘new era’

summary judgment

on these three seminal summary-judgment opinions (including Liberty Lobby),

then applied those principles to the case at hand. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479-1484. Notably for

our purposes, the Street court reversed summaryjudgment on certain claims, concluding:

We

determined *** that plaintiffs had not, Micawber—like, relied
on a forlorn hope that ”something would turn up" at trial. Nor
were they merely grasping at the straw of possible impeachment
of defense testimony, or relying on the now invalidated duty of
the trial court to search the record for some "metaphysical doubt”
as to a material fact that might be lurking there.
Rather, they had produced more than a scintilla of affirmative
evidence *** under the federal substantive law of fiduciary
relations and fraud under the federal securities or commodities
law. We found further that plaintiffs’ factual theories were not

implausible and that a rational trier of fact might resolve the
issues raised by defendants’ motion in plaintiffs’ favor. Therefore,
if the same evidence were produced at trial, a directed verdict

motion would be denied. So then must the motion for summary
judgment.
Id.

at 1483»84.

To the best of my knowledge the only time Street has appeared
opinions

is

in a

dissenting opinion drafted by former Justice Cook.

St.3d 280, 301, 1996-Ohio-107, 662 N.E.2d
this

264 (Cook,

J.,

one of this Court's

Dresher

v.

dissenting). This case thus presents

a substantial

failing

"more than

in

Street of

summary-judgment

and enlighten the bench and bar about what kind and quality of evidence
qualifies as

75 Ohio

Burt,

Court with the chance to adopt the ten principles the Sixth Circuit enunciated

new»era summary judgment practice, apply them to

by

in

in a

a scintilla of affirmative evidence" of actual malice.

record,

defamation case

The Eighth

District,

to address the substance of Mr. Kap|an's report, or other evidence Appellants

submitted on that

issue,

Nor, of course, did the

does not succeed

trial

court

Ill
5

in

explaining the basis for

postcard" decision.

its

summary judgment.

II.

Given that Ohio's unique privilege for opinions is not compelled by U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, Ohio courts must be cautious of applying Ohio's privilege too broadly
to factual assertions by editors on editorial pages, lest editors be wholly immunized
for reckless and damaging factual assertions they make on the State's editorial pages.

The

history of Ohio’s privilege for opinion speech

this appeal.

I

recall that

distinguish opinions

111 LvEd<2d

1,

from actionable assertions of

110

S.Ct.

worth noting

the Ohio Supreme Court ﬁrst adopted

was compelled by the

that no such test
19,

when

also

is

fact,

its

in

the context of

four-factor test to

the U.S. Supreme Court told this Court

Constitution‘ Milkovich

v.

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.

2695 (1990) (”We are not persuaded

1,

that, in addition to these

protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for ‘opinion’

is

the freedom of expression guaranteed by the

Former Chief Justice

Rehnquist,

who authored

”expressions of 'opinion’

liar” in

If

may

why

that

is

so,

often imply an assertion of objective fact.”

the Commentary at issue
a

Amendment/’)

Mi/kovich, took pains to explain

using an illustration that bears repeating here,
as a ”real

First

speaker says,

"In

in light

in this

my opinion

required to ensure

and cautioned that
Id.

at 18.

did so

of Mr. Lange’s description of Mr. Murray

case:

John Jones

is

a liar,”

he implies a

knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an
untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases

if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if
assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements
in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the
statement, "In my opinion Jones is a liar,’’ can cause as much
damage to reputation as the statement, "Jones is a liar.” As Judge
Friendly aptly stated: ’'[It] would be destructive of the law of libel
if a writer could escape liability for accusations of
[defamatory
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words
think.’’’ *** It is worthy of note that at common
law, even the
privilege of fair comment did not extend to "a false statement of
fact, whether it was expressly stated or implied from an
expression of opinion.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 556,

his opinion,
his

'I

Commenta (1977).

He

Milkovich,

497

U.S. at 19.

Former Chief

Justice Rehnquist’s

words remain trenchant, even though

this Court

decided to provide a ”separate and independent” privilege for opinion speech, over and above
the

Amendment.

First

182 (1995).

Vail

v.

Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72

For whether one’s conclusion appears

interpretation of the evidence, or
assertion of fact.

William Shakespeare,

Whenever
and

unjustified

obstacles

in

editorial,

or

termed an "opinion,"

calling a

person "a

we

call a

Romeo and Juliet, Act

summary»judgment
First

rose/By any other

rulings,

Ohio

plaintiffs

Amendment's guarantee

the Eighth

beyond what the

First

is

the result of one’s

name would

liar’’ is still

an

smell as sweet.”

2, sc. 2.

is

raised even higher by cursory

seeking to vindicate their reputations

to petition the courts...) will find additional

their path to meaningful access to a judicial

In this instance,

editors

an

in

Ohio's "separate and independent” hurdle

mention the

(not to

"[T]hat which

Cf.

is

Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 649 N.E.2d

remedy.

District did in fact raise

the bar for defamation claims against

Amendment commands and what

respect for our jury system

entails.

Although this Court has previously been careful to note that factual assertions on

editorial

pages

Commentary
importance

in

may be actionable} the

”is

Eighth District here concluded that the

whole of Lange’s

protected opinion designed to convey the writer's opinion on a matter of

the community.” (Opinion,

1]

30.)

Nonetheless, facts are

facts.

It

is

beyond

peradventure that Mr. Lange intended to convey — and did convey — multiple factual assertions

1

Wampler v.

Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 132, 2001-Ohio-1293, 752 N.E.2d 962 ("We do not
suggest here that publication of defamatory statements in a letter to the editor will insulate the
author from liability in every case/’).

10

to the readers of the Chagrin Valley Times about the subject
of his

Murray.

One does not :91"

for violations that

were "determined"

Crandall Canyon, even

assertions
potential

fully

civil

that a

if

company was ﬁned the government's

"highest penalty"

to have “directly contributed to" the terrible tragedy at

such assertions happen to appear on an op-ed page.

intending
liability,

"Happy New Year" gift to Mr.

them to be accepted

as facts.

One makes such

And one should do so aware of the

under circumstances where personal animosity or

subject can lead to a reckless disregard for the truth. But that

bias

toward the

liability is really just

a mirage,

unless courts return the role jurles have historically held in our republic
to decide disputed
facts.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
this

I

support Appellants‘ request for reconsideration and urge

Court to accept jurisdiction over this appeal.
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